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The logistics is an essential economic activity that is intended to manage the physical and data flows 
(informative, customs and financial), in order to provide the resources corresponding to more or Jess 
determined needs in compliance with the specified economic and legal conditions (subject to the quality- 
of-service targets and the security and safety conditions are satisfactory). The links between formalized 
information, risk management in production logistics and adaptation to technological and market 
changes, are essential to industrial companies. In this paper, we have followed a structured approach, 
keeping within a formai risk management framework, for continually improving production logistics 
practices and procedures by experience feedback processes. The information derived from the risk 
assessment in production logistics is formalized by the conceptual graphs, permitting to ease the logical 
expressions and enhance the semantic quality of visual representation produced. The proposai is 
illustrated more clearly by a concrete case study of the production logistics adopted for aircraft 
manufacturing in an European Aeronautic Company. 
1. Introduction
An industrial system, from a systemic point of view, is both an
open system and a finalized system, meaning that it is conceived 
and managed according to some objectives. The objectives that can 
be assigned are numerous: the cost, the quality, the production 
volume, the delay and the sustainability. These objectives 
encountered can be classified into three main categories: 
• Customer   service   improvement:   understanding   the   needs,
response time, quality and guidance provided.
• Cost contrai: the direct and indirect costs imposed on businesses.
• Productivity growth: the overall and individual productivity of
the various actions.
The strategies of industrial systems that are intended to 
contribute to achieve these objectives can be challenging but their 
attainment helps to develop the economic potential and ensures 
the survival, protection and prosperity of the considered enter- 
prises. This requires a level of productivity and profitability that is 
supported by the consistency and continuity of events occurring 
between the  internai  and  externat  environments.  In  particular, 
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there is a growing need for promoting good risk management 
practices [23] in order to anticipate and prevent ail risks which 
may occur within the company and work continuously to eradicate 
them. 
Risk management is defined as the identification, assessment, 
and prioritization of risks followed by the engagement of resources 
to treat (minimization or avoidance) and monitor the probability 
and/or impact of unfortunate events [13]. Furthermore, risk 
management is not limited to a purely static and negative outlook 
of these events. It also integrates a dynamic dimension showing a 
temporal distribution of the actions in the short, medium and long 
term with the options to exploit the realization of opportunities 
[19]. According to these constraints, the heart of the risk 
management is thus to find a suitable combination of provisional, 
preventive and curative actions, contributing to a significant 
reduction of the risks; and through the implementation of three 
main categories of risk analysis and assessment techniques 
(qualitative, quantitative, hybrid) [26]. 
In the industrial environment, within production logistics, the 
organization is often a full reflection on the way in which it could 
improve the means to achieve customer requirements and 
resources efficiency. Meanwhile, the production systems can 
operate in a constantly changing environment that causes the 
effect of uncertainty or hazards on target objectives (e.g. 
production rate of finished products). In this document, the 
selected domain of interest is production logistics that aims to 
ensure that each machine and workstation receive the right 
product in the right quantity and quality at the right time within a 
value- added system (e.g. a manufacturing unit or an industrial 
company) [28]. As the supply chain management encompasses ail 
logistics management activities, the production logistics is a part of 
the supply chain that streamlines and controls the flow of things 
(goods and services) through value-added processes. 
The core characteristics of supply chain risk can be classified in 
three main categories [18]: 
 
• Risk-affected objective (efficiency and effectiveness), 
• Risk exposition : disruptive triggers (triggering event and 
probability), time-based characteristics, and affected supply 
chain (vulnerability and resilience), 
• Risk attitude (aversion,  seeking, neutrality). 
 
The risk exposition is particularly determined by the occurrence 
of a triggering event, as well as by time-based characteristics of the 
underpinning supply chain. Indeed, ail the logistics associated with 
the production chain can be based on the importation of parts and 
tools from external suppliers. In such situations, there is an 
increase in the risk factors, particularly in terms of delays, non- 
compliance issues and damaged or missing parts. Add to this the 
internai factors of risks including the loss and damage of parts or 
tools, misunderstood requirements and overproduction. That is a 
disadvantage to the smooth functioning of the production systems 
of industrial companies and therefore with possible different risks, 
particularly in terms of the timetables and processes for delivery in 
the supply chain. Indeed,  production logistics management is 
required to properly analyze the production chain and consider 
various risks to this chain in order to try to eliminate, minimize or 
overcome some of the generated drawbacks by reducing the 
vulnerability of enterprises. 
The paper is structured as followed. Section 2 describes related 
research works. Section 3 exposes a process of risk management in 
production logistics with a focus on the risk identification and risk 
assessment. Section 4 presents the graph-based representation for 
a formalized description of risk information following identified 
production logistics risks and validates our approach with a real 
case study from the aeronautical industry. Section 5 provides a 
discussion on risk identification and assessment using formaliza- 
tion with conceptual graphs Finally, Section 6 gives the conclusion 
based on research findings and underlines some challenges. 
 
2. Related works 
 
According to standard ISO 31000 [17]. risk management should 
be a systematic and structured process (including establishing the 
context, risk identification, risk assessment, risk control and risk 
monitoring), which is capable of continuai improvement and 
enhancement. Risk management is of great interest to ensure 
continuity of production, proper supplies and the stability of the 
enterprise. In production logistics, each phase of the risk 
management process can be identified by the issues and questions 
that many researchers and engineers working in the field ask 
themselves: 
 
- Risk identification: does it have a risk? What are the damages 
associated with risks in the enterprise and its partners? What is 
the impact on customers, on the organization, etc.? 
- Risk assessment: what is the severity of a considered risk? 
What is the probability of a risk occurrence? 
- Risk control: through the implementation of actions planned in 
the short, medium and longer term: how to master, contain and 
control a risk? By implementing techniques of prevention and 
protection measures (e.g. training of company personnel), it is 
 
possible to develop proper mitigation  measures  of a risk or 
shared it with some partners? 
- Risk monitoring: What are the indicators to be put in place to 
monitor the evolution of risk and the effectiveness of a given 
action that was implemented? 
 
This four-step process is cyclic and it may be supplemented, if 
necessary, by the assessment of the residual risks remaining after 
the risk response or after the application of risk mitigation 
measures. In spite of ail the measures and precautions aimed at 
reducing a risk, what consequences should follow on from the 
occurrence of this risk? 
The literature comprises several methods on risk assessment in 
the field of production logistics; only two of the most well-known 
methods will be described: the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
(FMEA) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [30]. FMEA is a method that 
thoroughly analyses the elements and their failure mode features 
to assess risk and reliability in production systems. It begins by the 
decomposition of the system into subsystems. This method 
identifies and evaluates ail potential causes that may be sources 
of error to determine the effect they have at the element level. 
However, it does not clearly integrate element interactions but 
relies only on experienced knowledge. 
FTA describes event itineraries from failure root causes to top- 
Ievel consequences. This method  is applied  in the production 
system  to guarantee  the  safety and  improve the  reliability  of 
product development. FTA is intend to permit an actor to detect ail 
serious routes that might lead to an undesirable  event such as 
system malfunction or failure. Nevertheless, FTA also particularly 
depends on knowledge and experiences of stakeholders that are 
working in the target system. The collaborations and dynamics of 
the performance  requirements are not sufficiently apprehended 
for supporting the principles of supply chain resilience in complex 
organizations  of enterprises  [20]. In practice, complex systems 
require  means  to  supplement  and  reinforce  the  performance 
impact of their supplier integration operations through production 
logistics risk management  policies in risky environments  (40]. 
Furthermore, with the increased competition among the produc- 
tion logistics of organizations , modelling is important for analysing 
the level of maturity in enterprise risk management in complex 
international  companies  (29]. Such  large  companies  have  to 
comply with security initiatives and build a higher level of safety 
measures  to reduce  the  frequency  of  supply chain  disruption 
occurrences [32].In an environment of networked enterprises, it is 
admitted that the identification and management of these supply 
chain disruptions and risks is therefore crucial for the effective 
management of production logistics [12]. Effective management of 
supply chain risks requires a comprehensive yet rapid assessment 
of internai and external sources of risk events in the supply chain 
and their potential impacts in complex production systems (e.g. 
manufacturing system) [1]. Simulation and optimization models 
can be combined through some iterative procedures to achieve the 
best  values  for  risk  reduction  by  selecting  a  combination  of 
mitigation strategies [2]. lt is significant that most of the existing 
methodologies of risk management in production logistics lack 
inbuilt and practical techniques that take into consideration the 
complex interactions and dynamic feedback properties, which can 
meaningfully affect the reliability of risk management results (25]. 
ln  the  following  section,  a  methodological  approach   is 
presented  with  three  steps  including  risk  identification,  risk 
assessment  and  risk  treatment. This  methodological  approach 
provides an information formalization for intluencing factors in 
risk  management  for production  logistics. 
3. Risk management in production logistics 
 
In this paper, a major emphasis is piaced on the first three 
phases of risk management processes including risk identification, 
assessment and contrai, which are essentiaI to proper achievement 
of the next phase of risk monitoring. The proposed approach (see 
Fig. 1) applies the well-known Ishikawa diagram to a company case 
to identify root causes of the most important risks. Then we appiy 
the  Failure  Mode,  Effects  and  Criticality  Analysis  (FMECA) 
technique to determine the criticality of those risks. Finally, we 
add a conceptual graph and a logical expression to visualize and 
describe the actions to be taken when dealing with certain risks. 
The proposed approach is illustrated by the risk management in 
a leading Aeronautic company (belonging to the European 
Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS)) with production 
and manufacturing facilities. In the following sections, we focus on 
the risk identification and risk assessment, with some suggestions 
for the risk contrais (sharing, reduction, or avoidance of risk). 
 
3.1. Risk identification 
 
The risk identification is made to categorize the production 
logistics problems encountered in the organization of a network of 
suppliers. So, the considered production logistics  risks are 
associated with certain strategic and organizational choices of 
the company. More specifically, the focus is on the production 
logistics risks in the aircraft manufacturing induced either 
internally or externally by the suppliers, when the company is 
committed to respect deadlines and product quality in accordance 
with contractual obligations to the clients. Hence, the manufactur- 
ing, management and delivery of products are conditioned by the 
contractual deadlines negotiated between the company and the 
clients at the time the order is placed. Table 1 provides a summary 
of the identification of production logistics risks in the considered 
aeronautic context. 
There is a strong interaction between the logistics and ail other 
enterprise stakeholders: marketing in the definition of products, 
studies and research in the design of these products, methods in 
the definition and provision means of production, trade for 
evaluating sales volume and orders, production for the realization 
of the products, but also quality, etc. Specifically, the considered 
experts are specialists involved in the logistics activities covering 
the organization of flows shares, planning, customer relationship 
upstream (orders), purchase and supply of components, inventory 
management, transportation and commissioning available, rela- 
tionship to the downstream customer (delays, service rate), etc. 
Those experts include various transversal professions involved in 
the operation of major collaborative programs : project managers, 
quality specialists in project and product, logistics experts, but also 
of people dedicated to the planning, configuration management, 
customer support, etc. 
On the basis of an empirical study of the available data and 
expert estimations on the various existing risks in the considered 
aeronautic company, it appears that assessment of the risks related 
to production logistics function are obviously presented in the 
form of a table (see Table 2 ). 
In the Table 2, there are two colour scales which are intended to 
reflect the occurrence of a logistic risk and its potential severity. 
The  first  scale  consists  of  four  colour-coded  occurrence  levels 
( Certain (red), Likely (orange), Possible (honey), Rare (yellow)), and 
the second scale consists of three colour-coded severity levels (very 
serious (red), serious (orange), /ess serious (yellow)). In Table 3, the 
risk rating is specified using a two-dimensional matrix, with 
severity in one axis and occurrence  in the other. 
Frequency describes how many times the adverse consequence 
being assessed will actually be realized. The frequency-based score 
is suitable in most situations and is easier to determine in practice. 
A simple set of definitions for frequency is described as follows: 
Rare (this will probably never happen/recur), Possible (Might 
happen or recur occasionally), Likely (Will probably happen/recur 
but it is not a persisting issue) and Certain (Will undoubtedly 
happen/recur, possibly frequently). 
 
3.2. Risk assessment 
 
Risks are typically analysed by combining assessments of 
severity (also described as consequence) and occurrence (frequen- 
cy or likelihood ) in the setting of existing contrai procedures. On 
the whole, a risk rating is specified using a two-dimensional 
matrix, with severity as one axis and occurrence as the other. 
Following the presentation of the risk mapping associated with the 
production logistics function in Table 3, we seek to analyze the 
most important risks from the mapping done according to their 
severity and their occurrence. 
As regards the risk estimation, in order to reduce some 
disruptions throughout supply chains and the associated prohibi- 
tive costs, the working group of experts (including logistics experts 
and project managers and quality managers) structured reflections 
to deal effectively with the growing complexity of the logistics 
fonction. ln order to estimate risks, the experts elaborate some 
analysis concerning the deployment of the following elements: (i) 
a logistics protocol; (ii) benchmark assessments of logistics 
organizations and (lii) logistics performance indicators. Among 
the reflections, the group of experts also studied the possibility of 
developing a guide and a questionnaire for optimizing the 
implementation of collaborative engineering throughout the value 
chain, and for measuring the integration of analysis into 
professional  practices. In this case, it is interesting to offer an 
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Fig. 1. the flowchart of the proposed research methodology. 
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Table 1 
Identification of production logistics risks. 
Risks engendered by the: 
Network of suppliers 
• Risk related to non-compliance with quality 
 
 
 
 
 
Aeronautic companies 
• Risk generated by strategic choices. 
 
 
 
 
 
Companies commitments to logistics performance 
• Risk associated with waiting times. 
 
• Risk related to procurement space. 
 
• Risk generated by cost optimisation decisions. • Risk generated by overproduction. 
 
• Risk related to professional failures of production 
logistics and transport providers. 
 
• Risk generated by shortage of stock. 
 
 
 
• Risk generated by missing tools. 
 
• Risk associated with the delivery of finished 
products to the clients on the contractual dates and 
hours. 
 
• Risk generated by non-compliance with quality. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Risk assessment related to the production logistics function. 
Very serious 
•
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Certain 
•
 
Very serious 
•
 
ry serious 
•
 
Very serious 
•
 
 
 
 
 
enriched analysis allowing quick examination of the situation in 
terms of logistics and customer supplier relationships. The 
proposed logistic performance assessment framework is used in 
bath the self-assessment and the external audit by the aerospace 
industry companies. The specified analysis defines six common 
logistics performance indicators that can be used by the supply 
chain partners (including carriers and logistics providers). These 
six indicators are combined to enable a standard measure of the 
performance and its development: (1) respect of the deadline for 
the arrivai of parts and transportation, (2) waming on anomalies in 
the loading, (3) number of incidents (forgotten or damaged parts), 
(4) waming on delivery delays, (5) occupancy rate in transport and 
(6) reliability of stocks. 
The information exchanged with the experts helped to have a 
more comprehensive vision of the different industrial contexts. It is 
a crucial step to find through group assessment the most 
dangerous risks and their different causes. For instance, the very 
serious risks have been targeted through group discussions in 
collaboration with the key domain experts in the identified 
aeronautic industrial site. ln this way, the priority risks for this 
production logistics function were focused on a more restricted 
number of risks. The selected five  very serious risks are the 
following: 
Risk Occurrence of the risk Severity of the risk 
n°1 :Risk related to non-compliance with 
quality . Possible 0 
 
(major damage) 
n°2 :Risk related to procurement space. Possible 0 
Serious 
(important damage) Ü 
n°3 :Risk related to professional failures 
of production logistics and transport 
providers. 
Rare
 0 
Serious 
(important damage) Ü 
 
n°4 :Risk generated  by strategic choices. Likely
 0 
Serious 
(important damage) Ü 
n°5 :Risk generated  by cost optimisation 
decisions. Likely
 0 
Serious 
(important damage) Ü 
 
n°6 :Risk generated by shortage of stock. Possible 0 
 
(major damage) 
 
n°7 :Risk generated by missing tools. 
 Ve 
(major damage) 
 
n°8 :Risk associated with waiting limes. Likely
 0 
Very serious 
•
 (major damage) 
 
n°9 :Risk generated by overproduction . Rare
 0 
 
(major damage) 
n°10 :Risk associated with the  delivery of 
finished products to the clients on the 
contractual dates and hours . Certain 
•
 
Serious 
(important damage) Ü 
  
Table 3 
Risk mapping associated to the production logistics function. 
 
 
 
Rare Possible 
 
 
• n°7: Risk generated by missing tools. 
• n°8: Risk associated with waiting times. 
• n°1: Risk related to non-quality. 
• n°9: Risk generated by overproduction. 
• n°6: Risk generated by shortage of stock. 
 
The analysis of the root causes can take place using the Ishikawa 
diagram [[16,15,14]] (also called fishbone diagrams) for each 
identified risk. lndeed, this diagram is one of the seven basic tools 
of quality and its purpose is to break down (in progressive layers of 
detail) root causes that possibly contribute to a specific effect. 
Causes are typically grouped into main categories (People, 
Methods, Machines, Materials, Measurements and Environment ) 
to identify the sources of problems. The root causes analysis is 
important to determine the relevant corrective actions to avoid 
reoccurrence 
of identified problems and associated risks. For example, for the 
risk generated by missing tools, an Ishikawa diagram shows the 
root causes in Fig. 2. Particular attention is paid to certain 
parameters (state, lack of duplications, non-repairable and 
criticality). These contribute to better detection of the manufactur- 
ing tools requiring both an urgent analysis of the underlying causes 
and a deeper reflection on the most reliable methods for achieving 
a substantial and sustained reduction of risks. 
The waiting times represent the time periods during the 
production where no value is added to the product, including the 
waiting time for materials, information, equipment, tools, stock- 
outs, long processing times, downtimes and bottlenecks. Thus, the 
waiting times causes some risks in the supply chain. For the risk 
generated by the waiting times, an lshikawa diagram shows the 
root causes in Fig. 3. 
 
 
 
People 
Likely Certain 
 
 
The non-quality is the difference found between the target 
quality and the quality actually obtained. Consequently, some 
elementary parts, components and tools can be obtained at a lower 
quality. This clearly lead to a risk of clearly some sub-standard 
outputs of the required products ordered by the clients. The non- 
quality is a risk which also engendered other problems: significant 
contrai costs, unexpected delays in deliveries, and the  waiting 
times for production operations. For the risk generated by the non- 
quality, an lshikawa diagram displays the root causes in Fig. 4. 
Overproduction is a production with supply exceeding con- 
sumer demand of products. lt can add to the cost of inventories, 
work in progress, additional transportation requirements, addi- 
tional contrais, delays on other products, waiting times, and 
manufacturing slowdown or the interruption of the product flow. 
Indeed, it represents the worst forms of wastage, because it is the 
source of many others. For the risk generated by the overproduc- 
tion, an Ishikawa diagram displays the root causes in Fig. 5. 
The stock shortage represents the moment where the 
company's inventories are insufficient to meet the customer 
demand. Frequent shortages of stock causes some delays in 
carrying out tasks and thus a delay in the delivery of work, creating 
a negative picture of the organization. Moreover, the prolonged 
execution time may be behind the departure of certain clients 
following a crisis of confidence in business relationships regarding 
the client expectations. This can have a negative effect on the brand 
image and the economic performance of the considered aeronautic 
company. For the risk generated by the stock shortage, an lshikawa 
diagram displays the root causes in Fig. 6. 
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Fig. 2. Ishikawa diagram for missing tools. 
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Fig. 3. Ishikawa diagram for the waiting times. 
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Fig. 4. lshikawa diagram for the non-quality. 
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Fig. 5. Ishikawa diagram for the overproduction. 
 
3.3. Risk treatment 
 
In the risk assessment, we opted for the Failure mode, effects 
and criticality anaiysis (FMECA) [6], which is a reliability 
assessment technique allowing to study the potentiaI failure 
modes within a system. The FMECA is used to examine  the 
associated parameters (detectability, severity and occurrence ) of 
each identified risk, in order to determine their criticality. The risk 
priority calculation is a resuit of a multiplication of detectability x 
severity x occurrence and it provides a way to focus on the highest 
risks. Sorne recommendations  are suggested according to their 
relevance to  a  specific risk; and are important to reduce the 
impacts of critical risks. In fact, these recommendations to manage 
the identified and assessed risks fall into four main categories [8]: 
avoidance, reduction, sharing and retention. 
The different actions that can be used for recommendations of 
potential risk treatments are detailed in Table 4. 
From an operational point of view, the benefits of this approach 
are many and varied: 
 
• Identification  of  weaknesses  in  the  system  and  suggested 
recommendations. 
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Fig. 6. Ishikawa diagram for the stock shortage. 
 
Table 4 
The type of actions recommended. 
Type of action 
Avoidance 
Reducdon 
Sharing 
Retenâon 
Action to eliminate, withdraw from or not become involved. 
Action to optimize - mitigate the probability of the occurrence of the risk, while containing the causes of the risk to prevent its reoccurrence. 
Action to transfer - outsource or insure of the risk with one or more other parties. 
Action to accept and budget the risk in order to limit the severity of adverse effects, when the risk occurs. 
 
 
 
 
 
• Specification of the means to protect itself against certain 
failures. 
• Study of the consequences of failures with regard to the different 
individual components. 
• Classification of potential failures according to their impact on 
the risk management and mitigation actions. 
• Incorporation of improvements identified through the business 
and operational process optimization with internai and externat 
controis. 
 
The FMECA offive highest risks in the production logistics of the 
considered aeronautic company are described in Table 5 showing 
both numerical scoring and colour bandings. The risks situated in 
the cells identified with a red colour, are the risks that are most 
critical and that must be handled on a high priority strategy. The 
high risks are marked with an orange colour and the significant 
risks are marked with the yellow colour. 
ln the aeronautic context, the advantage of this FMECA 
application resides in its assessable and functional description 
of identified risks and the fact that it suggests effective solutions to 
improve the production system and better manage the risks at the 
level of the production logistics fonction. For instance, in order to 
contrai the risk of missing tools, reverse engineering is recom- 
mended. 
Specifically in order to deal with the risk generated by missing 
tools. reverse engineering is recommended. Reverse engineering is 
defined as the process of extracting design information or 
knowledge from anything man-made and re-producing it or 
reproducing anything based on the extracted information (9]. In 
this case, the objective of the reverse engineering process is to 
produce an updated documentation of legacy manufacturing 
systems. 
ln fact, some improvements on some earlier versions of many 
products have not been included in the technical drawings, so 
reverse engineering is useful for applications such as the updating 
of technical drawings of the outdated products without surface 
trimming or surface parameterization  [11]. Indeed, a significant 
risk situation is one in which the manufacturing or contrai tools are 
not replaceable and do not have any duplicates. In case of a 
technical problem during the manufacturing process, their 
replacement will be too long given the complex and multi-layered 
nature of the production processes involved, together with the 
pressure for productivity. Ifa tool breaks down emergency reverse 
engineering will have to be used in order to manufacture the tool 
that allows the operations  to continue in normal working 
conditions because it is difficult to create a new tool with existing 
20 drawings. Therefore, it is important to carry existing physical 
geometry into numerical product development environments with 
30 drawings and to create  a digital  30 record that takes into 
account new modifications to recent product developments. 
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that reverse engineering became 
a practical method to make a 30 virtual mode! of an existing 
physical part for use in 30 computer-aided design (CAO), 
computer-aided manufacturing (CAM), computer-aided engineer- 
ing (CAE) or other interoperable software [38,27,10,22,5,31]. In 
addition. an efficient reverse-engineered process can be used in an 
intelligent collaborative framework for minimizing redundant 
design stages and identifying design bottlenecks [24]. 
 
4. Conceptual graphs for formalized information of risk 
management 
 
4.1. Conceptual graphs  representation 
 
Conceptual graphs were introduced by Sowa as a diagrammatic 
system of logic with the purpose "to express meaning in a form 
that is logically precise, human readable and computationally 
tractable" [35]. Conceptual graphs encode knowledge as graphs 
and thus can be visualized in a natural way (36].Thus, the graph- 
based technique is used to represent information and knowledge 
about a considered domain [37] (e.g. the risk management).In fact. 
the    formai    conceptualization    of    shared    representations 
lnventory visibility Allocation 
Planning 
lnventory valuation 
Scheduling 
 Asset  management  Tracking 
 
Obsolescence 
Space Usage 
Complicated Contrai 
Environment Materials 
 Table 5 
The FMECA for the highest risks in the production logistics of the target aeronautic company. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
significantly influences the manner in which collaborative work 
takes place, as evidenced by their contribution in the exchange of 
information and generated knowledge [21,34]. 
The factual and procedural knowledge are based on the 
representation of concepts and their relationships. This represen- 
tation is encoded by a labelled graph, with two kinds of nodes, 
respectively corresponding to concepts (view by drawing a 
rectangle) and relations (view by drawing an aval), whereas edges 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
link a concept node to a relation node. [7].Conceptual graphs have 
an operational semantics in first order !agie and the decidability 
and complexity of the associated reasoning problem s (consistency 
and deduction ) has been analysed and discussed by some authors 
[3].Later, this decidability and complexity analysis was refined and 
interpreted with a coherent global view of decidable classes with 
conditions on conceptual  graph rule dependencies and formai 
reasoning mechanisms (forward and backward chaining) [4]. 
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Hypothesis description 
description Risk: Missing Tools 
Risk:  MlssingTools Criticality: 12 I 
 
 
Treatment    2    Action:Avoidance 
Action Plan: Reverse Engineering 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. A conceptual graph modelling a risk situation of missing tools. 
Logical expression: (Risk (Missing Tools) /\ Criticality (12)/\ Assessment (Missing Tools,12))    (Risk (Missing Tools) /\ Action (Avoidance) /\ Action Plan (Reverse Engineering) 
11 Treatment (Missing Tools, Avoidance) 11 Object (Avoidance, Reverse Engineering)) 
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A conceptual graph mie expresses implicit knowledge of the 
form: "if hypothesis, then conclusion", where the hypothesis and 
conclusion are both basic graphs. Using such a mie consists of 
adding the conclusion graph to some facts when the hypothesis 
graph is present. There is a one-to-one correspondence between 
some concept nodes of the hypothesis with concept nodes of the 
conclusion. Two nodes in correspondence refer to the same entity. 
These nodes are said  to be connection nodes. The knowledge 
encoded in mies can be made explicit by applying the mies to 
specified facts. 
 
4.2. Infonnation fonnalization  of production /ogistics risks 
 
After applying the FMECA  for the  production logistics risks, 
there is a need to formalise information of production logistics 
risks. So, the relevant conceptual graph mies are created to 
facilitate understanding of the logical description of the formalized 
information. In the considered study, only mies related to five 
highest risks in the production logistics will be examined. The 
associated concepts are "Risk", "Criticality", "Action Plan" and 
"Action". Action  Plan  is a concept describing the potential actions 
( avoidance, reduction, sharing and retention) to manage identified 
risks. 
Fig. 7 represents the modelling of the risk generated by missing 
tools with an associated mie in the conceptual graph formalism. 
The mie in Fig. 7 means, if a risk is caused by missing tools 
(industrial resources) with a criticality value equal to 12 then the 
recommended action should be avoidance having as its object the 
action plan of reverse engineering. 
Fig. 8 represents the modelling of the risk associated with the 
waiting times through an associated mie in the conceptual graph 
formalism. The rule in Fig. 8 means, if a risk is caused by waiting 
times with a criticality value equal to 6 then the recommended 
action should be sharing having as its object the action plan to 
outsource the adaptive Opportunity Management (OM) taking 
account of the manufacturing cycle and the most utilitarian 
allocation of resources. 
Fig. 9 represents the modelling of the risk associated with the 
non-quality through an associated mie in the conceptual graph 
formalism. The rule in Fig. 9 means, if a risk is caused by non- 
quality with a criticality value equal to 12 then the recommended 
action should be reduction having as its abject the action plan to 
ensure that a drawing (30) conforms to the manufactured products 
(conformity assessment). 
Fig. 10 represents the modelling of the risk generated by 
overproduction with an associated mie in the conceptual graph 
formalism. The rule in Fig. 10 means, if a risk is caused by 
overproduction with a criticality value equal to 8 then the 
recommended action should be reduction having as its object 
the action plan  to apply just -in-time. 
Fig. 11 represents the modelling of the risk generated by stock 
shortage with an associated mie in the conceptual graph 
formalism. The mie in Fig. 11 means, if a risk is caused by stock 
shortage with a criticality value equal to 8 then the recommended 
action should be avoidance having as its object the action plan to 
have a pertinent safety stock offinished parts fora minimum of one 
week. 
 
5. Discussion 
 
5.1. Risk identification and assessment 
 
Major risks identified in the context of our case study and 
engendered by suppliers include the risks related to (1) non- 
compliance with quality, (2) procurement space, and (3) profes- 
sional failures of production logistics and transport providers. 
Risks identified and engendered by aeronautic companies include 
the risks generated by (4) strategic choices, (5) the cost 
optimization decisions, (6) the shortage of stock, (7) missing 
tools, and (8) risk generated by non-compliance with quality. Other 
major risks identified and engendered by commitments of 
companies to logistics performance includes the risks associated 
with (9) waiting times, (10) overproduction, and (11) the delivery 
of finished products to the clients on time. 
The keys domain experts  include the logistics experts, the 
project managers and the quality managers who remain at the 
forefront of main risks. They play a significant role in providing 
experiences and advices to constmctors and equipment manu- 
facturers, who need to have means of actions encouraging risks 
reduction and mitigation. These experts investigate and develop 
conceptual enhancements for reducing the risk of supply 
dismptions and the prohibitive costs. They provide stmctured 
reflections to effectively deal with the growing complexity of the 
logistics function and to enhance the competitiveness of the 
product and service offered to its clients. . 
We exchanged information with experts from different 
industrial contexts and found through group assessments  the 
most dangerous risks and their different causes. Particularly, we 
analysed the above ten major risks with a mapping associated with 
appropriate production logistics functions. In collaboration with 
key domain experts in the identified aeronautic industrial site 
considered, and using group discussion, we  narrow down and 
ranked the identified ten major risks identified in our case to the 
following five critical risks: (1) risk generated by missing tools, (2) 
risk associated with waiting times, (3) risk related to non-quality, 
(4) risk generated by overproduction, and (5) risk generated by 
shortage of stock. 
FMECA (Failure mode, effects and criticality analysis) was 
adopted in this paper as reliability assessment technique to study 
potential failure modes in our case study. The FMECA of the above 
five highest critical risks in the production logistics of the 
considered aeronautic company is quantitatively described as 
follows: (1) missing tools risk has 80% of occurrence, 75% of 
severity, 33% of detectability and 100% of criticality, (2) waiting 
time risk has 40% of occurrence, 75% of severity, 33% of 
detectability and 50% of criticality, (3) non-quality  risk has 20% 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
Fig. 8. A conceptual graph modelling a risk situation of waiting times. 
Logical  expression:  (Risk (Waiting Times)  /\  Criticality  (6) /\  Assessment (Waiting Times,6))      ,  (Risk (Waiting Times) /\ Action (Sharing) /\ Action  Plan  (Adaptive  OM 
Outsourcing) /\  Treatment (Waiting Time, Sharing) /\  Object  (Sharing, Adaptive  OM Outsourcing)) 
Hypothesis 
description 
description 
 
Risk:Waiting Times Treatment 2 Action: Sharing 
Risk: Waiting Times 
2 
lmpllcatlon 
Fig. 9. A conceptual graph modelling a risk situation of non-quality. 
Logka1expression: (Risk (Non-Quality)  Il Criticality  (12)  Il Assessment  (Non-Quality,12)) --+  (Risk (Non-Qµality)  Il Action (Reduction) 11 Action  Plan (Drawing  Conformity 
Assessment)  /\  Treatment  (Non-Quality,  Reduction)  /\  Objec:t  (Reduction,  Drawing  Conformity Assessment)) 
Hypothesis 
 
 
 
 
 
1 lmpllcatlon 2 
 
Fig. 10. A conceptual graph modelling a risk situation of overproduction. 
Logka1spre5slon: (Risk (Overproduction) Il Criticality (8) Il Assessment (Overproduction, 8))    , (Risk (Overproduc:tion) Il Action (Reduc:tion) Il Action Plan Uust-in-Time 
Application) Il Treatment {Overproduction, Reduction) Il Object (Reduction, Just-in-lime Application)) 
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Action Plm:w..111y hrtln•nt Saftrty Stock 
 
Fig. 11. A conceptual graph modelling a risk situation of stock shortage. 
Logka1ll!:XPl'l!llSion: [Risk (Stock Shortage) Il Criticality (8) Il Assessment (Stock Shortage, 8)) --+ {Risk(Stock Shortage) Il Action (Avoidance) 11 Action Plan (Pertinent Safety 
Stock) /\  Treatment  (Stock Shortage, Avoidance)  /\  Object  (Avoidance,  Weeldy  Pertinent  Safety Stock)) 
 
of occurrence, 100% of severity, 100% of detectability and of 100% of 
criticality, (4) over-production 20% of occurrence, 100% of severity, 
66% of detectability and 66% of criticality, and (5) stock shortage 
20% of occurrence, 100% of severity, 66% of detectability and 66% of 
criticality. 
 
5.2. Conceptual graphs and fonnalizations 
 
In the case study described and examined in the aeronautic 
demain, a significant observation that can be made about the 
information and knowledge representation is the fact that 
experiences associated with the production logistics risks can be 
modelled using conceptual graphs. The visual modelling is 
enriched with logical expressions of formai rules to consolidate 
the reasoning process in risk management. The format visual 
representation of information and knowledge is intended to help 
relevant actors (within industrial production logistics organiza- 
tion) manage more efficiently at-risk situations with which they 
are confronted in their working situations. The operational 
procedure is to use computerized  conceptual  graph operations 
to highlight high-risk situations needing thorough investigation of 
observed facts and potential consequences. Dy structuring an 
experience knowledge base that includes descriptions of tessons 
leamt, it is possible to simplify the re-use of complex risk 
categorizations. lt analyses as well as the c:ontinuous improve- 
ment, enhancing existing practices with new arguments and 
interpretations. 
As regards the aeronautic company of the case study, the 
evaluation of production logistic:s risk is thoroughly related to the 
objectives that are required to be achieved by the underlying 
production logistics organization. The Ievel of attainment of these 
objectives is determined by on the exposition of the identified 
production logistic:s organization towards unanticipated and 
uncertain evolutions in the internat and external collaborative 
partnerships in a globalized economy. Rigorous knowledge 
reasoning instruments (such as those provided by conceptual 
graphs) may enable companies to formalise risks more easily and 
tomanage their production logistics risk exposure more efficiently. 
ln accordance with its ability to handle the disruptive triggers, 
production logistics organization might also outline some guiding 
principles (formai rules from tessons learnt) for the risk manage- 
ment within a continuai improvement process. The company may 
use engendered tessons learnt and time-based characteristics to 
better manage its risk attitude and for potential improvements of 
risk treatments in its production logistics organization. 
 
6.Conclusion 
 
Risk identification (source analysis or problem analysis) and 
assessment polides have a fundamental and influential place 
within the business management of the enterprise system. Risk 
management in production Iogistics is particularly important in 
terms of manufacturing, transportation, inventory and provision of 
products or services. It is aimed at managing risks in complex and 
dynamic procurement and collaborative networks with variable 
Hypotheal• 
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customer requirements [39]. Production logistics risk manage- 
ment usually involves four processes: identification, assessment, 
contrai, and monitoring of production logistics risks. ln this paper a 
major emphasis is placed on the phases of risk identification and 
risk assessment with some recommended actions for risk contrai. 
Thus, improved reasoning is intended to manage risks and 
opportunities to advance their potential treatments through visual 
and logical modelling and figures prominently in the proposed 
approach to formalise information and knowledge for production 
logistics risk management. 
To salve the initial problem of logistic risk management , we 
followed a structured approach with quality management tools. ln 
particular, we have established a methodology including the 
following three steps: 
 
• For the risk identification in production logistics, the root causes 
for each type of risk are determined (source analysis or problem 
analysis) by using the lshikawa Diagram 
• For the risk assessment in production logistics, FMECA is applied 
to highlight the highest risks, as well as providing recommen- 
dations to treat them. 
• For the risk contrai in production logistics, conceptual graphs are 
used for visual modelling and formai reasoning with associated 
logical representation. 
 
As a result of the formai representations chosen, the logical 
characteristics of conceptual graphs are used to represent formai 
rules for reasoning about risk modelling in production logistics. In 
conjunction with Ishikawa Diagram and FMECA, they can also be 
useful us to better understand the causes and consequences of 
significant risk situations with potential recommendations actions 
of risk contrais (reduction, avoidance or sharing).  Hence, the 
generated lessons learnt and associated knowledge can contribute 
to ease continuai improvement and enhancement in risk 
management   [45,44,41-43]. 
The research approach proposed can be used as a starting point, 
or it can be included in a decision support system [33] that allows 
risk managers to analyze, reduce or avoid the risk's detrimental 
effects, with integration of experts' knowledge and data provided 
by computational models. This is in line with the perspectives 
envisaged in our future research works in the risk management 
which calls for more graphical, formai and effective reasoning 
procedures in the field of production logistics. 
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